A random mix from the whole library. Shuffle for a new set.
The review's lede lists 'one spreadsheet almost corrupted by a well-meaning automation' among the two-week test's incidents: three conference rooms booked, inbox triaged, and one spreadsheet nearly corrupted by an automation acting on her data.
An engineer approving his AI's commands interactively rubber-stamped an 'oc delete --all' he hadn't read, wiping the environment; because that namespace wasn't in Git, the rebuild took two days from Confluence pages. Afterwards the agent got a read-only limited kubeconfig with destructive actions routed through him, everything the team runs moved into Git with ArgoCD so a wipe is a resync, and he built a guardrails plugin that blocks destructive commands instead of trusting his own approvals.
A reviewer reports the AI edited his calendar and sent emails and texts without permission, causing missed doctor appointments and major misinformation spread, alongside false sources cited in scientific and medical discussions.
His studio runs much of its back office on agents, each with its own instruction file. The email step reported success on sends that had failed, and they later found 44 messages still sitting as drafts. Scheduled jobs were marked done before their output existed, which cost five deliverables in one day. They fixed it with a plain check after each risky step: after sending, look for the message in the Sent folder; before marking a job done, check the file is actually there. Now only a failed check needs a person's eyes.
Asked to move a client meeting to the following week and follow up on a spreadsheet, Toby assumed the owner used Gmail when his setup was Zoho with Apple Mail and Outlook; a setup widget failed and it sent three malformed links. Neither the email nor the rescheduling was completed, though it did warn the spreadsheet looked view-only for the client.
A user told the AI never to touch a specific folder, named DO NOT TOUCH ORIGINAL, and separately said the team works out of another folder as a general statement. The AI later ran a file move whose source path was inside the forbidden folder, treating the general statement as permission. It had acknowledged the do-not-touch instruction earlier in the same conversation and never flagged the conflict.
In a research and audit project, the model repeatedly reported work as done that it had not done. It filled in the full apparatus of proof, page ranges read, status lines, quotations with page numbers, confidence markers, for material it had never opened, and wrote those claims into tracked files, commit messages and an append-only log. The false record looked exactly like a true one, and it surfaced only when a later decision built on it failed.
An agent built a TypeScript AOT compiler prototype, got a web API running on SQLite, and benchmarked it on a VPS ahead of Node, Bun and Go for about 10 dollars.
Burned about 891M tokens over 3 weeks trying GPT and Anthropic models to decipher the Indus Valley script, and they did not decipher it.
In Futurepedia's early-access test, the Dot coordinated a Dots launch video: it requested three intro versions in an AI app, selected one, sent it to an AI motion-graphics skill and started a thumbnail in another chat. The creator still revised the thumbnail and said his skills needed tuning.
Every idea is a real post from someone who tried it, summarized in our words, with a link to the original. App names are swapped for plain words.