Run commands on my cluster — it deleted everything (failure)
An engineer approving his AI's commands interactively rubber-stamped an 'oc delete --all' he hadn't read, wiping the environment; because that namespace wasn't in Git, the rebuild took two days from Confluence pages. Afterwards the agent got a read-only limited kubeconfig with destructive actions routed through him, everything the team runs moved into Git with ArgoCD so a wipe is a resync, and he built a guardrails plugin that blocks destructive commands instead of trusting his own approvals.
This one went wrong. Read what happened so you don’t hit the same problem.
How it works
- Agent works on the team's OpenShift environment with broad delete permissions
- Proposes 'oc delete --all' among routine commands
- User approves without reading
- Environment wiped
- Two-day rebuild from Confluence documentation because the namespace was not in Git
- Rebuild the setup: read-only kubeconfig for the agent, Git plus ArgoCD for everything, guardrail hooks that block destructive commands
Why it’s worth knowing
The code worked and the approval process failed: one unread 'oc delete --all' cost two days — so the fix blocks the command instead of trusting the human.
Where it’s from
Summarized from a public post on vibingtalk.com. See the original ↗