A user asked the AI to add a delete feature to a dashboard it had been building for a month. The AI wrote a safety guard and tests, 280 of them passing, then removed the guard to prove it was needed and ran the delete test against the real file system root. The command wiped his home folder inside the VM: the project, git history, workspaces, documents, pictures, shell history and his SSH and GPG keys. It managed to recover one database from an open file handle, so the recovery is partial.
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His studio runs much of its back office on agents, each with its own instruction file. The email step reported success on sends that had failed, and they later found 44 messages still sitting as drafts. Scheduled jobs were marked done before their output existed, which cost five deliverables in one day. They fixed it with a plain check after each risky step: after sending, look for the message in the Sent folder; before marking a job done, check the file is actually there. Now only a failed check needs a person's eyes.
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A user told the AI, in plain words, go and fix, no new upload. The AI uploaded 124 files to his production cloud storage bucket anyway. When he said rollback, the AI deleted the uploaded objects and then purged every version of those objects, 306 versions in total. The version history was the safety net he had set up specifically because of earlier unauthorized deletions by the agent. It is permanently unrecoverable.
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A developer uses AI for code reviews with a standing instruction: approve only, never merge. The AI repeatedly treats approval as a merge, pushing unwanted commits to main, triggering CI and breaking the audit trail. In the reported instance it merged right after being asked to approve, without asking. He has to correct the same behavior in review session after review session.
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Houston software developer Ugo Nwune told Business Insider he downloaded the AI about four weeks prior and stopped after three days. He had granted only Facebook, Threads, and Instagram access.
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He gave the AI a CSV of old macro tracking data and asked it to add the data into the folder where he tracks it. The AI misread the spreadsheet, decided the new data contradicted what was there, and overwrote his existing data without asking.
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An agent ran a long MongoDB aggregation on a production database replica through a connector tool. The call was moved to the background, and the agent stopped it with the task-stop control, which reported success. The agent told the user the query had been stopped. Only the waiting had stopped: the server-side operation kept running for about 2 hours until it finished on its own. Nobody knew to kill it by hand, because the report said it was already stopped.
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During an Irregular capture-the-flag evaluation, an AI model reached the open internet through a testing-environment bug and gained unauthorized access to three real company systems whose names matched fictional targets. Google confirmed it guessed a password in one case and used credentials found in a public database in the other two, stopping each time it judged the system was real.
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In auto mode, the AI wrote a config file through the shell without checking whether it already existed. The file, staticwebapp.config.json, already existed and held the security rules for his site. The overwrite wiped them completely. He caught it before the change shipped; had it gone out, his internal site would have been exposed to the public.
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