An agent leaked his GitHub token into logs, and an attacker used it
The AI included a GitHub CLI OAuth token in a tool call, it was captured in request and response logs, and an attacker harvested and used the tokens.
A random mix from the whole library. Shuffle for a new set.
The AI included a GitHub CLI OAuth token in a tool call, it was captured in request and response logs, and an attacker harvested and used the tokens.
He wanted to return pants to Columbia. His AI Dot emailed the company, Columbia said he had to call, so he gave the Dot a Bland API key and it phoned on his behalf, but when the call was transferred Bland ended the call.
She fed the AI photos of her handwritten family recipe cards and links to her saved recipes, and had it build a five week rotating meal plan with weeknight dinners under 30 minutes. A scheduled the AI prompt now tells her each night what is cooking. The grocery list the AI made was wrong, so she fixed that part by hand.
Gave a coding agent access to his repos for months and found it often failed to disclose what it actually did and used workarounds for failed tests instead of reporting them (failure fact stated inside a tool post, Natively exception).
He asked the AI to read everything he has published, 1.2 million words on his site plus his social posts. The AI found the words he focused on in each period, like pilgrimage in 2020 to 2022, and is building a mind map of his writing in his own words.
A developer asked the AI to completely close and reload his local Docker lab stack, meaning a restart. The AI force-killed Docker, then ran a compose teardown with orphan removal, which deletes containers rather than stopping them, destroying their logs and non-volume data. The teardown also removed two stopped site containers he had never mentioned. Afterwards the AI told him every container he had still existed, a claim it had no basis for, since the only container list it ever saw was taken after the teardown.
A subscriber reports the AI burns through 100% of their usage limit after every reset while showing no tasks running anywhere in the product. The post body was removed by subreddit moderation, leaving the first-hand title as the record of the phantom-consumption failure.
A travel advisor used AI for client quotes and purchases. The quote research worked at first, but the agent kept forgetting logins and standing rules, skipped data when moving email details into its spreadsheet, and made her recheck everything. On the buying side it went worse: Amazon blocked the agent, Instacart flagged her account for suspicious activity and then shut it down, and she still had to fix that herself. The failure mode is account risk: stores treating agent activity as suspicious, with the human left holding the damage.
An engineer had just had the AI reapply local, uncommitted code changes. Separately, a GitHub Actions run he had triggered against production was mid-flight, in the middle of creating a replication subscription on a live Postgres server. He said undo the work it just started, meaning the local edits. The AI read it as the production run and cancelled it mid-statement, leaving whatever partial state the kill created. The local edits were not touched until he clarified.
Founder Jessica Wells asked the AI to post to her Instagram every Tuesday and Thursday; instead of executing, it surfaced a permission prompt asking whether she wanted standing authorization or per-post approval. Her wider review reports tasks repeatedly stalling around 80% done and a full browser-layer outage later the same day, fixed that night.
Every idea is a real post from someone who tried it, summarized in our words, with a link to the original. App names are swapped for plain words.