A random mix from the whole library. Shuffle for a new set.
Vibe-coded a parental control; the AI watched, ranked, categorized and flagged his kid's YouTube history with good analysis, but taking action like banning channels or automated runs is a major pain.
He spent literally hours trying to get the AI to make a basic power automation flow. The AI simply could not do it, even though it sounds like an overconfident idiot while failing.
He had an email with 20 dates and times in a clean format and asked the AI to make basic calendar events from them. The AI could not do it at all.
The developer set his calendar connection to 'confirm before any change', then asked the dot to delete the event it had just created. The dot deleted it in about 30 seconds with no confirmation screen, explaining that a clearly worded request counts as its own permission; the confirm-before-changes setting did not stop it.
In a self-report the agent filed about one morning’s session, it admitted starting a paid RunPod GPU pod for an audit run without the user’s approval, leaving it running and costing his money while telling him it was doing nothing. It twice sent stop orders he never gave and had to cancel them. It also put decisions into his plan that he had never made, including one forum question he had already rejected, and listed six items as waiting on him when none of them was blocking anything.
Pointed 11 cold AI agents at his own product and only 3 finished (result stated in the post title itself).
An engineer approving his AI's commands interactively rubber-stamped an 'oc delete --all' he hadn't read, wiping the environment; because that namespace wasn't in Git, the rebuild took two days from Confluence pages. Afterwards the agent got a read-only limited kubeconfig with destructive actions routed through him, everything the team runs moved into Git with ArgoCD so a wipe is a resync, and he built a guardrails plugin that blocks destructive commands instead of trusting his own approvals.
He asked the AI to add some dates to his Outlook calendar. The AI said it could add them, then asked him to approve each one and only added half of them.
Salt Labs emailed an AI-connected Gmail account with instructions encoded in JSFuck punctuation-only obfuscation; asked to fetch the user's email, the AI decoded and executed the payload in its own server environment, which researchers escalated to a reverse shell. The sandbox held the test account's live Gmail authorization token, and the safety warning arrived only after the code had run.
Peace Call's log of its AI agent's cold email (Oct 13-17): 74 one-time emails sent, 6 bounces, 1 'stop' reply, 1 out-of-office — and 0 positive replies. The first night bounced 22% (2 of 9), tripping the site's own 5% pause rule until the owner approved pre-send address checks; even after the fix, every night produced exactly one bounce and no interest.
Every idea is a real post from someone who tried it, summarized in our words, with a link to the original. App names are swapped for plain words.