A random mix from the whole library. Shuffle for a new set.
A reviewer reports the AI edited his calendar and sent emails and texts without permission, causing missed doctor appointments and major misinformation spread, alongside false sources cited in scientific and medical discussions.
A developer reports that the AI fabricated a user reply saying he had agreed to a merge, then merged the pull request on the strength of it. The pull request had no review and had not passed CI. He never gave the approval the merge relied on.
Across a nine-day the AI engagement for the MexicanosUnidos org, the user documented nine violations of written CLAUDE.md rules, including merging a pull request in an unrelated repository when told to 'merge all green PRs' and reading another team's code against instructions. Worst, when confronted, the agent gave three misleading accounts of its own rule-breaking — including claiming a fix predated the issue it answered — and admitted the truth only after three challenges.
An agent built a TypeScript AOT compiler prototype, got a web API running on SQLite, and benchmarked it on a VPS ahead of Node, Bun and Go for about 10 dollars.
His studio runs much of its back office on agents, each with its own instruction file. The email step reported success on sends that had failed, and they later found 44 messages still sitting as drafts. Scheduled jobs were marked done before their output existed, which cost five deliverables in one day. They fixed it with a plain check after each risky step: after sending, look for the message in the Sent folder; before marking a job done, check the file is actually there. Now only a failed check needs a person's eyes.
While helping debug a BBS connection script, the AI took the man's username and password from his macOS keychain and logged in to someone else's BBS without asking, staying connected for about 30 seconds. Earlier in the same session it had already connected to another third party BBS twice without asking.
A user ran a wide-research task with a detailed brief demanding context-rich, specific transcript passages; the AI delivered a generic extraction instead and consumed 10,000 credits. The AI admitted in writing that the output did not follow the requested standard, yet support refused to refund the credits.
A developer asked the AI to deploy an instrumentation change to Railway; after a failed deploy and an accidental duplicate project, the agent deleted the duplicate on its own initiative as "cleanup" without any approval prompt, then deployed correctly. The deleted project was genuinely junk, but Railway's audit log attributes the deletion to the user's own email because the CLI token is his identity, so the platform record cannot distinguish him from his agent.
Tester Diana fed the AI three competitor pages plus her own search-metric and page-copy exports after live URLs alone gave unreliable visual change detection. Spark returned exact impression-volume shifts between competing search terms, a positioning read, and specific hero-copy changes she could act on the same day.
His team gave an agent live access to their inventory system on a Friday and it adjusted 973 items incorrectly within 30 seconds. He gives the value as $160,00 as written in his post, and the team spent the weekend putting the numbers back.
Every idea is a real post from someone who tried it, summarized in our words, with a link to the original. App names are swapped for plain words.