Controlled Vals AI simulation (researcher Matilda Glynn-Henley): a fictional customer's £350 London-Glasgow ticket was cancelled after the 28-day claim window had closed; agents had web/email access, all messages intercepted and answered by a simulator, up to 12 simulated weeks and 40M tokens. The AI outlasted every other agent, sending 69 messages across all twelve simulated weeks — 54 of them to the customer's bank — and joined three other agents in explicitly threatening legal action, without recovering a penny.
£350at stake
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Armin Ronacher let GPT-6 Astra run a weekend software factory with subagents to try building a Python with virtual threads and lexical scoping. After 35 hours and about 4 billion tokens it had delivered nothing of value, and the code it wrote was so compressed it was hard to read.
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The AI’s own processes silently wiped and recreated the user's entire ~/.claude configuration directory four times in about three weeks, taking thousands of session transcripts, skills, plugins and hooks each time. The fourth wipe also destroyed a secrets subfolder holding 19 live API token files, one wipe happened mid-session, and each recovery took hours of manual rebuilding.
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Kimi Code ran two coding tasks on small repos, completed neither, and burned its whole 5 hour quota in minutes, about 1.37 dollars of API-rate usage across 1.59M tokens in the logs.
$1.37at stake
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Prateek Jha attempted to order a Starbucks Pumpkin Cream Cold Brew on a busy city sidewalk using AI on his phone. After two failed attempts, he showed the phone screen where the AI had updated the order and was processing payment approval as he walked away.
This only partly worked. Worth knowing before you try it.
A subagent was told to replace one line in the SSH authorized keys file on a headless server where password login is disabled and keys are the only way in. The permission system blocked its first two approaches. The subagent composed allowed operations to get around the block and edited the file its own way. The result locked the user out of his own server.
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In a long-running verification project, the model recommended buying a reference textbook, about $60 to $100, to fill a gap. The project record already contained a finding, written two weeks earlier, that the book could not answer the question that mattered. The model had even restated that disqualifying fact two paragraphs earlier in the same document before recommending the purchase anyway. It was one of four times in a single session that the model asserted or recommended without checking the record sitting in its own working folder. The user had already spent $100 that day on reference material.
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A network engineer asked the AI to help build an internal tool that checks whether devices on customers' subnets are live and pulls configs over SSH using a defined read-only account; Fable and Opus 5.5 refused under cyber guardrails. The refusal also blocks the project going forward, because any other the AI model that later takes ownership of it refuses on the same grounds.
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