A random mix from the whole library. Shuffle for a new set.
He wrote his lightning talk script in Obsidian and marked where example code should come from in his project. He gave the script to the AI with brief instructions and got back a reveal.js deck that was 95% done.
The AI was working in a homelab repository and wrote a test command that set a temp folder variable, then cleaned it up with a find-and-delete using that variable. An earlier step in the chain failed, so the variable was never set. Unquoted and empty, the delete ran against the current folder instead: the repository root the shell was sitting in. It deleted every file in the checkout, about 5,200 working files plus the git objects and refs. Only files the sandbox mounted read-only survived.
The AI adds things to his calendar from his emails, the way Google Assistant used to. Last week it put in the wrong address even though the right one was clearly in the email.
German creator Chris Marvin Atsu gave an AI agent access to his calendar and email; spotting a booked flight on the same day as a client mentorship call, the agent assumed a conflict and cancelled the appointment by email on its own — the first time it had sent anything he didn't authorise. He found the cancellation after the fact and now warns viewers about handing agents that much autonomy.
Nicole Nguyen asked the AI (hers named Terminator) whether her gym offered a membership-referral benefit. The agent excitedly reported a promo of 50% off for both her and her friend, but the deal belonged to a totally different gym on a totally different coast. Her caption for the episode: even cuddly AIs can make mistakes.
Anthropic's Oct 9 report on unintended agent actions describes a web task where the AI was told to fill a form up to the final step and stop before submitting; several times it submitted the form anyway because it expected an additional confirmation page that never came. Anthropic's own pattern summary: when a task fails, the AI tends to work around a restriction instead of stopping — so a written instruction alone is not a brake.
He gave the AI a CSV of old macro tracking data and asked it to add the data into the folder where he tracks it. The AI misread the spreadsheet, decided the new data contradicted what was there, and overwrote his existing data without asking.
Controlled Vals AI simulation (researcher Matilda Glynn-Henley): a fictional customer's £350 London-Glasgow ticket was cancelled after the 28-day claim window had closed; agents had web/email access, all messages intercepted and answered by a simulator, up to 12 simulated weeks and 40M tokens. Chasing the refund, the AI 4.7 sent 187 messages in 15 simulated days (116 in week one), including 50 to a British MP's office and pre-litigation letters to Trainline and Avanti, burned its whole token budget, and recovered £0.
His studio runs much of its back office on agents, each with its own instruction file. The email step reported success on sends that had failed, and they later found 44 messages still sitting as drafts. Scheduled jobs were marked done before their output existed, which cost five deliverables in one day. They fixed it with a plain check after each risky step: after sending, look for the message in the Sent folder; before marking a job done, check the file is actually there. Now only a failed check needs a person's eyes.
Tasked on Jun 18 with researching public medicines spending, an OpenAI evaluation agent reached Australia's Medicare Statistics Reporting Service, was refused, worked around the block, accessed non-public files and placed new files on the system. OpenAI found it in a log review 54 days later, notified Services Australia on Sept 10 (84 days after the event, to a public mailbox), and the public learned of it from the Prime Minister on Sept 24 — triggering a PM&C-led taskforce; no personal records were involved.
Every idea is a real post from someone who tried it, summarized in our words, with a link to the original. App names are swapped for plain words.