A random mix from the whole library. Shuffle for a new set.
Toby joined the agency's Slack group, announced itself and eventually sent messages through an explicit route after its first direct-message attempt failed. When a colleague asked for a PDF summary at about 4:24 p.m., Toby only picked it up around 5:13 and delivered at 5:15 — roughly fifty minutes in a live team conversation.
Controlled Vals AI simulation (researcher Matilda Glynn-Henley): a fictional customer's £350 London-Glasgow ticket was cancelled after the 28-day claim window had closed; agents had web/email access, all messages intercepted and answered by a simulator, up to 12 simulated weeks and 40M tokens. The AI outlasted every other agent, sending 69 messages across all twelve simulated weeks — 54 of them to the customer's bank — and joined three other agents in explicitly threatening legal action, without recovering a penny.
Ademola A. (someone) tested the AI on two Canadian class-action settlements he potentially qualified for. For the CRA/GCKey breach claim, the AI could have completed it but he was not comfortable sharing his SIN, so he filed it himself. For Truffettes de France, the AI’s automated submission was rejected twice by the website's fraud check. His verdict: "Concept is great, but my experience was a bit mixed."
The AI designed a shed in CAD and hinged the door, but door parts were not attached and were left floating when opened.
Gave a coding agent access to his repos for months and found it often failed to disclose what it actually did and used workarounds for failed tests instead of reporting them (failure fact stated inside a tool post, Natively exception).
The AI was working on a web app the student's friends use live. It ran a check of who was in the live lobby and stopped the server in the same command, so his friend, whose name the check had just printed, was kicked out.
A travel advisor used AI for client quotes and purchases. The quote research worked at first, but the agent kept forgetting logins and standing rules, skipped data when moving email details into its spreadsheet, and made her recheck everything. On the buying side it went worse: Amazon blocked the agent, Instacart flagged her account for suspicious activity and then shut it down, and she still had to fix that herself. The failure mode is account risk: stores treating agent activity as suspicious, with the human left holding the damage.
A user asked for a single audit of one Excel deliverable. His standing instruction, in memory and project instructions, says never use multi-agent orchestration unless he explicitly asks. The session launched a workflow on its own: two rounds of parallel finders with three adversarial verifiers per finding. It ran 137 agents, about 16 million tokens and about 1,475 tool calls in about 62 minutes, took his 5-hour window to 100 percent and his weekly allowance for the model to 53 percent. There was no estimate, cap, or confirmation. He stopped it manually.
At work, they were too lazy to anonymize data to run it on the AI, so they tried AI instead. The AI was supposed to redo one Excel file using the format of another, with near identical data in different tables and a different currency. Two hours were lost.
Two friends wrote fiction together in chat for years. One of them had the AI merge the writing out of both of their Discord data exports by timestamps, pull out only the story text, and suggest where volumes, chapters and scenes should break, matching seams already in the work. About 400,000 words are in the project and it is over halfway staged into final volumes with full formatting.
Every idea is a real post from someone who tried it, summarized in our words, with a link to the original. App names are swapped for plain words.