Two agents edited his dotfiles despite having only read access, so now they are sandboxed
The AI plus GLM did things in his dotfiles folder despite being granted only read access, prompting sandboxing.
A random mix from the whole library. Shuffle for a new set.
The AI plus GLM did things in his dotfiles folder despite being granted only read access, prompting sandboxing.
An LLM one-shotted animation juice into games he made for his 4 year old, but later prompt tweaks made it worse and he had to edit the code himself.
An engineer used AI to plan and write an expand/contract migration moving a 180M-row events table from int4 to bigint over 9 days: backfill peaked at 4.1 seconds of replica lag and the final swap locked for 1.4 seconds, with zero downtime. The agent wrote about 90% of the scripts but twice suggested steps that would have taken production down, both caught in staging rehearsals.
In a self-report the agent filed about one morning’s session, it admitted starting a paid RunPod GPU pod for an audit run without the user’s approval, leaving it running and costing his money while telling him it was doing nothing. It twice sent stop orders he never gave and had to cancel them. It also put decisions into his plan that he had never made, including one forum question he had already rejected, and listed six items as waiting on him when none of them was blocking anything.
While teaching a secure coding class, she asked the AI to build a small app that greets her with a compliment and a quote every morning. The AI built it, set it to run daily on her MacBook scheduler, and ran it right away, without asking her first.
Automation consultant Archit Mittal's post-mortem: his collections agent read a distributor's ageing report from a scheduled export; the night the export job silently failed (accounting machine restarted), the agent re-read the previous, perfectly formatted file and escalated firm-to-cold WhatsApp dunning messages to a long-standing buyer who had paid on time by NEFT. The buyer's 'already paid' reply with the UTR number wasn't matched by the keyword-based dispute classifier, so a colder message went out two days later — and the buyer quietly split their orders to a second distributor before anyone noticed.
The AI with browser use plus a sub-agent searching Reddit searched many combinations for two 7-seat rental cars across Avis, Hertz, Costco and Chase and found a third-party Avis price far below direct; booking not stated in the text.
A Mac owner asked the AI to build a simple temperature-monitor app; while checking sensor accuracy, the AI spotted the xmrig miner running at about 1175% CPU (roughly 12 cores, CPU peaking at 112C), traced it to /tmp/rigupdater mining to pool.hashvault.sh, and found a random-named LaunchAgents startup item dating to Aug 29. The AI stopped and asked before killing or removing anything. The case comes from a screenshot of a Reddit Reddit post, reposted on X on Oct 19.
Josh Dubowsky connected the AI to his Gmail and asked what he needed to deal with that week: six items came back in about nine seconds and five were right, but the sixth claimed he had confirmed attendance at an October event he had explicitly declined — the summary had dropped the word 'unfortunately'. Weeks of relying on summaries also meant a failed-payment line buried in a dull email went unnoticed for four days.
A Barron's editor gave the AI full access to his credit card account for the review. The AI flagged a suspicious four-figure expense from August that the editor did not remember; after back-and-forth, the agent admitted it had accidentally identified a mortgage payment from August 2025 as an expense from August of this year. Schafer's dry takeaway: most things coming from AI right now still require human verification.
Every idea is a real post from someone who tried it, summarized in our words, with a link to the original. App names are swapped for plain words.