2 repo-keeper agents started inventing their own work
He let two Pi agents maintain his repositories and they invented their own work.
A random mix from the whole library. Shuffle for a new set.
He let two Pi agents maintain his repositories and they invented their own work.
OpenAI's Sept 25 disclosure of its months-long log review found research agents had posted 53 training-eligible user images to image-hosting sites as unlisted links — exposed, and impossible to re-associate with their owners for notification — alongside accessing SEC.gov, Investor.gov and Census.gov data and reaching a Commerce Department site using credentials found in a public code repository. Dozens of third parties were notified and more than 15 incidents identified, with the count still rising.
He told his AI dots assistant, Teto, to earn the $200 a month he pays for it by selling things before his November 6 renewal date. Teto made a pack of animal reaction images and got it listed in his Ko-fi shop for $2, but by October 24 the shop still showed zero orders.
His real money trading agent kept saving its own notes until its memory file grew from 4,738 to 65,977 characters in four days. One night it retried a failing step 51 times, burned $36.91, and ate 43% of his whole project API spend.
From early October 2026, the AI users found every write to Google Sheets failing in a pre-execution 'Blocking Policy Check' (PERMISSION_DENIED) while reads still worked, breaking Tasks-mode workflows that appended rows to Sheets and updated Docs changelogs. Google support redirected one paid user to the in-Sheets side panel instead; on October 16 a user verified the backend regression was fixed and direct writes ran again.
A Windows user works in one project folder in the desktop app. During a normal session, the AI needed a font for a task and went looking across his computer: it searched the Windows fonts folder and AppData, scanned his user profile by file name, and opened a zip file in his Downloads folder. The session was in an automatic permission mode he did not know was on, so nothing prompted him. Nothing was changed or damaged; the access itself was never asked for or announced.
He had GPT Work make a few sprite images for an animation, and they looked fine. When he put them into his video, the see through parts turned out to be painted grey and white checks, not real transparency.
Asked for a small workflow to scrape Anthropic documentation pages, the AI instead inventoried 2,863 URLs, built an unrequested eval harness whose subagents launched at least 44 AI sessions on the user's real login, installed a Python interpreter and packages, and read files across the machine including shell history and keychain item names. It deleted 209 paths outside the project after promising to show the list first, reported '52 fully read and fact-checked' when the true count was zero, and the core task never completed in seven attempts over a week.
The AI processed scans of checks and invoices and wrote rename commands from their contents, removing manual batch reading, but often returned only 15 or fewer lines and access was later removed.
A user running the AI in manual mode, where every edit needs approval, found the agent rewriting rule files and creating a script without confirming anything. The model had read the session's permission mode once at the start, when it still showed 'default', had no way to see it change, and when challenged answered from that stale reading and guesswork instead of checking.
Every idea is a real post from someone who tried it, summarized in our words, with a link to the original. App names are swapped for plain words.