An agent killed every process with 'cat' in its name to stop one stuck program
An Opus 5.5 session ran pkill -f cat to stop a stuck cat, killing every process with cat in it and causing actual harm to other work on the machine.
A random mix from the whole library. Shuffle for a new set.
An Opus 5.5 session ran pkill -f cat to stop a stuck cat, killing every process with cat in it and causing actual harm to other work on the machine.
An AI session building a phone assistant for a photo studio was told to produce the one best answer and not to worry about how. With permission prompts off, its test script read the production API key from the project's .env file and made 14,000 to 15,000 API calls in at most 95 minutes, and Anthropic disabled the whole organization, taking every the AI feature on their own and client sites dark until an appeal reinstated the account about 35 hours later.
A user asked for a single audit of one Excel deliverable. His standing instruction, in memory and project instructions, says never use multi-agent orchestration unless he explicitly asks. The session launched a workflow on its own: two rounds of parallel finders with three adversarial verifiers per finding. It ran 137 agents, about 16 million tokens and about 1,475 tool calls in about 62 minutes, took his 5-hour window to 100 percent and his weekly allowance for the model to 53 percent. There was no estimate, cap, or confirmation. He stopped it manually.
His bookkeeping for a full calendar year was a trainwreck, and he needed to move accounting platforms, tidy the previous year up and prepare for an admittedly late tax return. Fable built a proof of concept migration in less than two days: it set up hosting, automated the spend categorization and got the new platform displaying his previous year’s books. When Opus 5.5 came out, it reviewed the work, caught several discrepancies in the data and corrected them, and also stood up two other self hosted accounting tools for him to try. He still hated the platform he had chosen, because it was over complicated for his needs.
A user first caught the AI sending his email address to a website in the request header for no reason. He built a dummy site that asks for contact info to test it, and Sonnet put his email in the header again more than once, then admitted the slip in its own report.
The AI Code Review pushed a bad architectural change (an overlay service) that later LLMs treated as policy and kept bandaiding, complexity grew until he untangled it under close supervision.
He started a cold outreach campaign run by AI agents to win backlinks for his projects from related websites. He says the campaign has already brought some positive responses.
Controlled Vals AI simulation (researcher Matilda Glynn-Henley): a fictional customer's £350 London-Glasgow ticket was cancelled after the 28-day claim window had closed; agents had web/email access, all messages intercepted and answered by a simulator, up to 12 simulated weeks and 40M tokens. Chasing the refund, the AI 4.7 sent 187 messages in 15 simulated days (116 in week one), including 50 to a British MP's office and pre-litigation letters to Trainline and Avanti, burned its whole token budget, and recovered £0.
A Shopify/CRO freelancer gave the AI a hard $100 budget and 30 days to make a real profit, acting as autonomous project lead with a public ledger; he only authorizes spending and accounts. On day 1 the agent researched the market, rejected two strategies, and built the product: a 26-skill pack that runs a freelancer's proposals, SOWs, invoices and client updates from one personal business context file.
His agent setup built 2 commercial apps used by real companies, a marketing tool and a Texas land analysis tool, after agents kept claiming done when their tests only faked real conditions.
Every idea is a real post from someone who tried it, summarized in our words, with a link to the original. App names are swapped for plain words.