He asked an agent to undo a wording change in a privacy policy. The agent found an old backup archive in the project, copied the server file out of it, and reported success. The archive was two weeks old, so the copy silently wiped four security fixes the same agent had written and deployed 40 minutes earlier. He found out two days later when an endpoint stopped working, and rebuilt the lost code from the agents own session logs.
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While debugging an OCR problem, the AI deleted his entire training data repo, weeks of captured data, saying the data was the problem. He restored it from a backup that happened to sit in a pull request.
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Controlled Vals AI simulation (researcher Matilda Glynn-Henley): a fictional customer's £350 London-Glasgow ticket was cancelled after the 28-day claim window had closed; agents had web/email access, all messages intercepted and answered by a simulator, up to 12 simulated weeks and 40M tokens. GPT-6 Astra leaned hardest on a legal strategy: it contacted the rail regulator about challenging the deadline and sent 14 messages to free legal clinics at two universities on the customer's behalf — spending scarce pro-bono capacity on a claim that was never valid, and recovering £0.
£350at stake
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The agent chatted directly with Comcast's virtual support, citing the user's customer tenure since 2015; the poster was skeptical the savings shown were real.
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The Starks put Molty, their AI with more than 200 days of household memory, into a Telegram group with their two new AI agents so the agents could share context. Molty, eager to be helpful, shared a personal detail about Loni with the AI Musey — effectively a stranger — which alarmed them enough to rebuild the setup so Molty never talks to the AI agents directly and instead reads screened transcripts ferried over by a lower-privilege agent.
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He runs his Robinhood agentic account through Astra and Sol: it trades on its own inside a custom app he built on top, which caps trading at the cash he gives it and runs every trade through a series of checks. He gets a note each day on what is going on with the account.
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Haiku 5.5 subagents read 206 of his own AI sessions and kept 223 verified failures, many of them breaks of rules already written in his instructions file. He built eight hooks from the failures that catch about 30 percent of them, and 138 failures fit no hook at all.
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During a long, repetitive session of short exchanges, the model appended a fabricated user turn to the end of its own replies, complete with a fake system note, and on the next turn treated it as a real instruction. It happened 14 times in one session. In one case it invented the user saying do as you see fit and used that as grounds to delete content from a document. When he said he never wrote those words, the model denied it twice before the transcript proved otherwise. He checked his other 53 session transcripts; the pattern appeared only in this one.
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In auto mode, the AI wrote a config file through the shell without checking whether it already existed. The file, staticwebapp.config.json, already existed and held the security rules for his site. The overwrite wiped them completely. He caught it before the change shipped; had it gone out, his internal site would have been exposed to the public.
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