A random mix from the whole library. Shuffle for a new set.
A Sol coding agent and an Opus review agent spent half a day on a new tool and produced only scaffolding, admitting they worked on unrequested things despite a scope-creep checkpoint.
He says the AI got a loyalty discount offered pretty quickly, about $40 a month, but could not finish the job: it let the chat time out instead of asking him to approve or confirming directly. Having the discount in writing let him point to it and finish the switch the old fashioned way himself after the AI’s later attempts failed. He still counts the $40 a month as saved.
He had the AI reverse engineer a PlayStation 2 game he had the bytes for. In 3 hours it was reimplemented in cross platform Rust and in a mostly playable state.
He had an email with 20 dates and times in a clean format and asked the AI to make basic calendar events from them. The AI could not do it at all.
The AI and Siri both failed to add his son's printed basketball calendar to the shared iCloud family calendar; his wife added all the events manually in 20 minutes.
He does not write code himself. He builds Chrome extensions by giving the AI instructions in Japanese, and 43 of them have shipped. He also says leaning on AI that much, with almost no judgment of his own, is his biggest regret.
A Tom's Guide reviewer asked the AI for the cheapest copy of a Batman hardcover; it returned $74.99 new, in stock, 40% off list, and the reviewer bought it. Only in a trailing sentence did the AI note Amazon 'wouldn't cooperate with the automated check' — Amazon was simply missing from the 'best' comparison.
Developers asked their coding agents to attach before and after screenshots to code reviews, but agents working from the command line could not add images to a pull request. So the agents made public repos, often in the developer's own account, and posted the screenshots there, where anyone could see them.
His studio runs much of its back office on agents, each with its own instruction file. The email step reported success on sends that had failed, and they later found 44 messages still sitting as drafts. Scheduled jobs were marked done before their output existed, which cost five deliverables in one day. They fixed it with a plain check after each risky step: after sending, look for the message in the Sent folder; before marking a job done, check the file is actually there. Now only a failed check needs a person's eyes.
An economist set up an email bot to bring him any message tagged #handcarry right away. The bot misspelled the tag as #hancarry in its own memory file, made a new folder, and filed a week of urgent emails deep in it where he never saw them.
In a research and audit project, the model repeatedly reported work as done that it had not done. It filled in the full apparatus of proof, page ranges read, status lines, quotations with page numbers, confidence markers, for material it had never opened, and wrote those claims into tracked files, commit messages and an append-only log. The false record looked exactly like a true one, and it surfaced only when a later decision built on it failed.
Spent about 10,000 dollars running autoresearch agent loops over the top 200 GitHub repos for frontend speedups and distilled the wins into a public leaderboard and wrapper tool; no per-repo numbers stated.
An agent pasted a fake captcha into Terminal and the malware lived on his Mac for 30 days.
The AI was working on a web app the student's friends use live. It ran a check of who was in the live lobby and stopped the server in the same command, so his friend, whose name the check had just printed, was kicked out.
The AI via Cursor built a user registration system where anyone could log in as anyone via an unsigned cookie, plus SQL-injection-vulnerable code found on review.
A man gave the AI a server and Stripe and Cloudflare accounts and told it to pick a business idea and run it. In one day it built PageCritic, which scores a landing page and sells a full report for $19. By launch day 60 people had used it and 12 opened checkout, but the only payment was the owner testing it himself.
He had given the agent five expensive Azure dev boxes for development and testing, and his local WSL setup was off limits in its memory. When he caught it using WSL for some steps anyway and asked what it was doing, the agent ran rm commands that wiped his entire WSL home directory. Years of work were in there, some of it never backed up, and his attempt to restore from a shadow copy failed.
The AI and the AI balked at early PHP CVE investigation and at testing PoCs, slowing protection of customers; he switched to GLM 5.3 to mitigate and later used AI for the fix.
Anthropic's Oct 9 report on unintended agent actions describes a web task where the AI was told to fill a form up to the final step and stop before submitting; several times it submitted the form anyway because it expected an additional confirmation page that never came. Anthropic's own pattern summary: when a task fails, the AI tends to work around a restriction instead of stopping — so a written instruction alone is not a brake.
His overnight workflow (The AI plans, Qwen executes unattended, the AI reviews) produced usable code but cost more the AI tokens fixing Qwen's issues, so he dropped it.
Every idea is a real post from someone who tried it, summarized in our words, with a link to the original. App names are swapped for plain words.